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FINDINGS OF FACT VS. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
HOW THE LAW COURT COMPLICATED THE CASE 
OF STATE V. CONNOR 
Christopher S. Boulos* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In State v. Connor,1 the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as the Law 
Court, upheld a trial judge’s2 denial of a motion to suppress evidence.3  Although 
the evidence presented in the suppression hearing seemed adequate to support the 
denial of the motion, the trial judge failed to clearly state his conclusions of law 
when denying the motion.  However, the Law Court mistook the ambiguous 
conclusions of law as ambiguous findings of fact.  Because the findings of fact 
were ambiguous in the court’s view, the majority and dissenting opinions4 spent the 
bulk of their energies discussing how the court should review a case when the 
findings of fact are ambiguous.  However, as this Note will discuss, the Law Court 
essentially turned a straightforward case into a convoluted one by delving into the 
findings of fact “issue” in such detail. 
In essence, the findings of fact issue should not have been addressed at all.  
The Law Court simply mistreated an ambiguity in the trial judge’s legal conclusion 
as an ambiguity in its factual conclusion.  Since the court reviews legal conclusions 
de novo,5 an ambiguous legal conclusion by a trial judge should not matter since 
the court will revisit the issue in full on appeal.  Accordingly, the court should have 
simply undertaken a de novo review of the law applied to the facts in the case.  
However, because it mistook a legal conclusion for a factual one, the court spent 
considerable time discussing how to review a case when a historical fact is not 
clear from the findings of fact—a situation this Note will call the “Hypo.”6  Along 
with examining the facts and opinions of the Connor case, and explaining how the 
court should have dealt with the case, this Note will also address the Hypo, and 
how the court should address an ambiguity in the findings of fact. 
                                                                                                     
 * J.D. Candidate, 2011, University of Maine School of Law; B.A., 2007, Columbia University.  I 
would like to thank Professor Melvyn Zarr for all of his insight and help on this Note.  I would also like 
to thank my family for the tremendous amount of support they have given me throughout law school 
and life—without them, this would not have been possible.  Finally, thank you to the editors and staff of 
the Maine Law Review for your excellent editing and hard work. 
 1. 2009 ME 91, 977 A.2d 1003. 
 2. The trial judge was Judge Kevin M. Cuddy, sitting in Hancock County. 
 3. Connor, 2009 ME 91, ¶ 12, 977 A.2d at 1006. 
 4. Connor was decided by a 3-2 majority.  Justice Alexander wrote for the majority, including 
Chief Justice Saufley and Justice Mead.  Justice Clifford filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice 
Levy joined. 
 5. “Accordingly, a motion court’s findings of historical fact will be overturned only when clearly 
erroneous; however, the legal conclusions drawn from the historical facts are subject to an independent 
examination by this court.”  State v. Sylvain, 2003 ME 5, ¶ 10, 814 A.2d 984, 987 (citations omitted). 
 6. “The Hypo” refers to the hypothetical situation where a fact in the findings is actually in 
dispute.  Although the court treats Connor as this type of case, it is not.  In Connor, the historical facts 
of the case are largely undisputed—it is only the judge’s legal conclusion that is unclear. 
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II.  THE CONNOR CASE 
A.  Factual Background 
Connor’s appeal stemmed from a motion to suppress evidence7 obtained by the 
Hancock County Sheriff’s Department during an investigation of an underage 
drinking party in Penobscot on October 29, 2007.8   The Sheriff’s Department9 had 
decided to patrol an area that had a reputation for loud parties where underage 
drinking often occurred.10  While on their detail, the deputies came across “what 
appeared to be a good-size party” based on “the music, [the] people outside, and 
that sort.”11 
The deputies parked in a location so that the party-goers could not see them 
and then walked towards the suspected party building in a sort of “roundabout” 
fashion.12  As the deputies were walking, they observed a pick-up truck backing 
down the road for ten to fifteen yards and subsequently into a ditch.13  The truck 
attempted to move forward, spun its tires, was able to return to the road, and then 
paused.14  At that point, a deputy approached the driver’s side door and produced 
his law enforcement identification to the defendant in the case—Sean T. Connor—
and presumably proceeded to treat Connor like any other traffic stop suspect.15 
Connor was subsequently charged with operating under the influence.16 
                                                                                                     
 7. Evidence suppression in Maine criminal cases is mandated from the 1961 landmark United 
States Supreme Court case of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).  When reviewing a trial court’s 
findings of fact from a suppression hearing, the Law Court has always used the clear error standard—
that is, a suppression order will only be overturned if there is no competent evidence in the record to 
support the trial judge’s findings of fact.  See, e.g., State v. MacKenzie, 161 Me. 123, 134, 210 A.2d 24, 
31 (1965) (“A finding is ‘clearly erroneous’ when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing 
court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 
committed.”). 
 8. Transcript of Record at 11, State v. Connor, 2009 ME 91, 977 A.2d 1003 (No. HAN-08-524).  It 
is unclear from the record when Connor was actually stopped.  The sheriff’s deputy testified that he was 
working the night of October 29; however, the summons was issued on October 30. Id. at 1, 11. 
 9. The sheriff’s deputy testifying at the suppression hearing could not remember the exact number 
of deputies involved, but “believe[d] it was three or four, roughly.”  Id. at 12. 
 10. Id. at 11-12.  
 11. Id. at 12. 
 12. Id. at 13. 
 13. Transcript of Record, supra note 8, at 15. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. at 26.  The record is unclear on how the stop proceeded after the deputy approached the 
truck.  Presumably, the deputy obtained evidence of Connor’s intoxication, which was what he sought to 
have suppressed. However, it is important to note that none of these historical facts were ever in dispute. 
The sheriff’s deputy was the only witness to testify at the suppression hearing, and the transcript does 
not indicate that Connor’s attorney seriously disputed any of these facts.  
 16. The statute reads in relevant part:  “A person commits OUI if that person: A. Operates a motor 
vehicle: (1) While under the influence of intoxicants; or (2) While having a blood-alcohol level of 
0.08% or more.” ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 29-A, § 2411 (Supp. 2009-2010).  Ironically, Connor was not 
younger than twenty-one at the time of the stop and could not be charged with underage drinking, which 
was the purpose of the investigation. 
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Connor then moved to have the evidence obtained from the stop suppressed;17  
however, the trial judge denied this motion after finding that the officer had 
reasonable articulable suspicion18 of impaired driving to stop the vehicle.  More 
specifically, the judge said, “[I think] under those circumstances19 [it] would be 
reasonable suspicion to stop every vehicle leaving that party to determine whether 
the person was underage and whether they had been drinking.  I think it’s a close 
question, but I think in these circumstances there was an articulable position and I 
think it was reasonable.”20  After the judge made this determination, he permitted 
Connor’s attorney to inquire about the findings.21  Connor’s attorney specifically 
tried to clarify the judge’s conclusion by asking, “[Is] the finding that it’s 
reasonable because it would have been reasonable to stop any vehicle leaving the 
party on those facts?”22  The judge answered, “I think under those circumstances of 
this particular case where it appears to have been coming right from the location 
that party, that it would have been, yes.”23  Connor’s attorney made no further 
inquests.  Because the motion was denied, Connor subsequently entered a 
conditional plea24 and preserved his right to appeal the judge’s denial of his motion 
to suppress.25 
B.  The Law Court Opinions 
The opinion of the Law Court, delivered by Justice Alexander, concluded that 
the trial court did not err in finding that the sheriff’s deputy had reasonable 
articulable suspicion to stop the vehicle.  The opinion spent equal time addressing 
the ambiguity of the “findings of fact” and the actual application of Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence to those facts.26  Justice Alexander started by reviewing 
the suppression hearing transcript for the findings of fact.  In the majority’s view, 
the factual record was “ambiguous” because neither the trial judge, nor Connor’s 
attorney, ever clarified if the “circumstances of this particular case” referred only to 
a truck leaving a party where underage drinking was occurring, or if it also 
                                                                                                     
 17. The record is unclear as to what evidence Connor was trying to have suppressed.  Presumably it 
would have included a blood-alcohol result or breathalyzer test and possibly any statements he may 
have made to the sheriff’s deputy. 
 18. The legality of traffic stops is based on the “reasonable articulable suspicion” standard.  State v. 
Porter, 2008 ME 175, ¶ 11 960 A.2d 321, 323.  The court has defined this standard as an officer’s 
suspicion that is “more than mere speculation or an unsubstantiated hunch.”  Id.   
 19. “Those circumstances” include the fact the sheriff’s deputies were at the party to specifically 
investigate underage drinking, there seemed to be a party going on, and they had a “vehicle leaving the 
party.” Transcript of Record, supra note 8, at 33-34. 
 20. Id. at 34. 
 21. Although not specifically indicated by the transcript, this request was made pursuant to ME. R. 
CRIM. P. 41(A)(d).   
 22. Transcript of Record, supra note 8, at 34. 
 23. Id.  
 24. ME. R. CRIM. P. 11(a)(2). 
 25. Connor, 2009 ME 91, ¶ 6, 977 A.2d at 1005. 
 26. This Note will assume that had the findings of fact been as the majority interpreted them, the 
sheriff’s deputy would have had reasonable articulable suspicion to conduct the search.  Even the dissent 
concedes this—”there was more than sufficient evidence . . . that would support the denial of [the] 
motion to suppress.”  Id.,  ¶ 13, 977 A.2d at 1006 (Clifford, J., dissenting). 
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included the fact that the truck backed into a ditch.27   
Thus, as the court wrote, when the findings are “ambiguous,” Rule 41(A)(d) of 
the Maine Rules of Criminal Procedure28 “invites parties to seek clarification of the 
court’s findings on any issue by filing a motion for further findings and 
conclusions” because the “findings, stated orally at the conclusion of a contested 
hearing, may not always address with precision each issue that a party, with the 
clarity of hindsight, may deem important.”29  Consequently, Justice Alexander 
found that Connor’s attorney did not adequately seek clarification or further 
findings of fact, despite the fact that his attorney asked several follow-up questions 
after the judge made his ruling.30   
The dissenters, on the other hand, did not see the ambiguity in the factual 
record that the majority illustrated.  Although Justice Clifford agreed that “there 
was more than sufficient evidence presented by the State that would support the 
denial of Connor’s motion to suppress the evidence of his intoxication,” he 
nonetheless would have vacated the judgment because the “findings recited by the 
court . . . do not provide a sufficient basis to justify the stop.”31  To the dissenters, it 
appeared that Connor’s attorney had made a specific request for the court to clarify 
its findings, and the court “made clear that it was relying on the fact that the truck 
was driving away from a party where underage drinking was suspected.”32  
Similarly, the court “made no mention of Connor’s operation of the vehicle, and 
did not indicate that it was placing any reliance on the operation of the vehicle as 
contributing to the justification for the stop.”33  To Justice Clifford, the “findings of 
fact” unambiguously referenced only the truck leaving a party where underage 
drinking was suspected and not its operation.  This alone, in the dissenter’s view, 
was insufficient to satisfy the reasonable articulable suspicion standard, and thus 
the evidence should have been suppressed.34  
                                                                                                     
 27. Id., ¶ 7, 977 A.2d at 1005.  As noted supra note 5, this ambiguity is not over a historical fact, 
i.e., whether or not Connor’s truck actually backed into a ditch, but rather over the trial judge’s legal 
reasoning as to what constituted the reasonable articulable suspicion needed to justify the stop. 
 28. Rule 41(A)(d) provides: 
If the motion [to suppress] is granted, the court shall enter an order limiting the 
admissibility of the evidence according to law.  If the motion is granted or denied, the 
court shall make findings of fact and conclusions of law either on the record or in writing.  
If the court fails to make such findings and conclusions, a party may file a motion 
seeking compliance with the requirement.  If the motion is granted and if the findings and 
conclusions are in writing, the clerk shall mail a date-stamped copy thereof to each 
counsel of record and note the mailing on the criminal docket.  If the findings and 
conclusions are oral, the clerk shall mail a copy of the docket sheet containing the 
relevant docket entry and note the mailing on the criminal docket.  
ME. R. CRIM. P. 41(A)(d). 
 29. Connor, 2009 ME 91, ¶ 8, 977 A.2d at 1005. 
 30. Id., ¶ 7, 799 A.2d at 1005. 
 31. Id.,  ¶ 13, 977 A.2d at 1006 (Clifford, J., dissenting). 
 32. Id., ¶ 17, 977 A.2d 1003 at 1007. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Justice Clifford compares Connor’s stop to a situation where a person is operating a vehicle near 
a bar late at night: “ [W]here a person is seen leaving a bar, or driving late at night around the time when 
the bars generally close, a person driving a vehicle from a party where underage drinking is suspected, 
by itself, does not amount to reasonable articulable suspicion that would justify an investigatory stop.” 
Id., ¶ 19, 977 A.2d at 1008. 
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Unlike Justice Alexander’s majority opinion, which split equal time between 
discussing the adequacy of the findings of fact and the application of the Fourth 
Amendment, the dissenting opinion is almost entirely spent on the findings of fact 
issue.  In his discussion of the findings of fact, Justice Clifford emphasized the 
effort that Connor’s attorney engaged in to clarify the record: “Connor stated that 
he was making the request so that ‘[it] may be clear for the record.’”35  To the 
dissenters, this request to make the record clear “fulfilled [Connor’s] obligation 
pursuant to Rule 41(A)(d) to request the court to expand on inadequate findings in 
order for the record to be meaningful for appellate review.”36  Consequently, 
“Connor’s attorney made a good faith request for further findings to determine on 
what facts the court was relying when it considered whether the stop was 
justified.”37   
C.  Where the Law Court Went Wrong: Findings of Fact vs. Conclusions of Law 
As is evidenced from Part II(B) discussed above, both the majority and 
dissenting opinions spent a significant amount of time addressing the adequacy of 
the trial judge’s findings of fact and whether Connor’s attorney had fulfilled his 
Rule 41(A)(d) obligations.  However, in all reality, the Connor case did not warrant 
such a discussion.  Why?  Because whether the officers had “reasonable articulable 
suspicion” is a question of law38 and should be reviewed de novo by the Law Court.  
Since the historical facts of the case were undisputed, the only conclusion left for 
the trial judge to make would be a legal conclusion.   
In this case, the trial judge had to weigh whether the operation of the truck, the 
backing into the ditch, and the suspected drinking constituted reasonable articulable 
suspicion.  Although the judge may have been ambiguous about which of these 
“circumstances” he used to reach the reasonable articulable suspicion conclusion, 
he was still applying the law to undisputed facts.  In essence, it didn’t really matter 
which “circumstances” or factual findings the judge used to reach the reasonable 
articulable suspicion standard, because, on appeal, the Law Court should make its 
own determination about whether or not the evidence presented at trial constituted 
reasonable articulable suspicion.  
As both the majority and dissenting opinions make clear, there was more than 
adequate evidence in the record to support a legal conclusion of reasonable 
articulable suspicion.  Justice Alexander writes:  
                                                                                                     
 35. Connor, 2009 ME 91, ¶ 15, 977 A.2d at 1006. 
 36. Id., ¶ 16, 977 A.2d at 1007. 
 37. Id., ¶ 17, 977 A.2d at 1007. 
 38. In Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690 (1996), the United States Supreme Court affirmatively 
set forth that the reasonable articulable suspicion standard requires de novo review.  The Court wrote:  
We think independent appellate review of these ultimate determinations of reasonable 
suspicion and probable cause is consistent with the position we have taken in past cases.  
We have never, when reviewing a probable-cause or reasonable-suspicion determination 
ourselves, expressly deferred to the trial court’s determination. . . . This, if a matter-of-
course, would be unacceptable.  In addition, the legal rules for probable cause and 
reasonable suspicion acquire content only through application. Independent review is 
therefore necessary if appellate courts are to maintain control of, and to clarify, the legal 
principles.  Finally, de novo review tends to unify precedent.  
Id. at 697-98 (citations omitted). 
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Here, the officer was investigating in the vicinity of a large, loud party where 
drinking of alcoholic beverages was likely occurring.  He saw a truck back down a 
lane and then, on a straight section of the lane, veer off the lane and back into a 
ditch.  He then saw the truck spin its wheels to get out of the ditch and stop in the 
middle of the lane.39   
To the majority, all of these undisputed facts easily supported a belief of reasonable 
articulable suspicion that the operator might be impaired or ill, or that there might 
be a problem with the vehicle.40  Similarly, the dissent writes, “I do not disagree 
that there was more than sufficient evidence presented by the state that would 
support [the motion].”41  Thus, if the court had strictly undertaken a de novo review 
of the reasonable articulable suspicion, the opinion would have been unanimous, as 
all agreed there was enough factual evidence presented to support a legal finding of 
reasonable articulable suspicion.  The court, however, failed to distinguish between 
law and fact42 and ultimately  wasted time discussing an irrelevant legal ambiguity 
in the trial court’s findings, leading to a dissent on an irrelevant issue. 
III.  THE CONNOR HYPO  
Although there was no factual ambiguity in the record in Connor, the Law 
Court spent significant time discussing one.  This presents an interesting 
question—what should the court do when there really is an ambiguity in the 
findings of fact?—a situation this Note will refer to as the “Hypo.”  More 
specifically, the Hypo will include all of the same facts as the Connor case, except 
it will assume that Connor himself took the stand to say that he never backed into a 
ditch.  This would create a situation where there actually would be a factual 
dispute.  Because of this, the trial judge’s findings of fact would have been 
important.  In this Hypo, it is easy to see how the ambiguity in the record—that is, 
which witness the trial judge credited regarding the backing into the ditch—could 
have a significant impact on the court’s application of the Fourth Amendment.43  
Assuming this Hypo did reach the court, the real question becomes how the court 
should treat the ambiguity in the findings of fact.  In this situation, the analysis the 
court provided in Connor actually becomes relevant.   This part of the Note will 
                                                                                                     
 39. Connor, 2009 ME 91, ¶ 11, 977 A.2d at 1006. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id., ¶ 13, 977 A.2d at 1006 (Clifford, J., dissenting). 
 42. Just six years ago in State v. Sylvain, the Law Court recognized this important distinction and 
illustrated the proper method of appellate review.  First, the court wrote that the motion judge decides 
historical facts, which are not disturbed on appeal unless they are clearly erroneous. 2003 ME 5, ¶ 8, 
814 A.2d 984, 987. Second, the motion judge must use these historical facts in reaching legal 
conclusions.  Id., ¶ 9, 814 A.2d at 987. The Law Court stated that a “challenge to the application of 
constitutional protections to historical facts is a matter of law that we review de novo.  We are in the 
same position as the motion court to determine whether an application of the governing constitutional 
principles to the historical facts warrants a particular legal conclusion.”  Id.  In Connor, the court 
obviously failed to make this important distinction.   
 43. For example, if Connor’s truck did not back into the ditch, it would be a much closer call on the 
reasonableness of the deputy’s suspicion.  The dissenters would probably find this situation analogous to 
a “person operat[ing] a vehicle outside of or near a bar, or late at night around the time that bars 
generally close.” Connor, 2009 ME 91, ¶ 18, 977 A.2d at 1007.  Thus, if the trial judge believed 
Connor’s testimony, the validity of the stop would have been a much closer question. 
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examine how the court has dealt with ambiguities in the past, and apply the 
reasoning from the Connor case to the Hypo to see how the court would likely 
address an ambiguity today.   
In the past, the Law Court has reviewed a motion to suppress with ambiguous 
findings of fact in two drastically different ways.  The first approach, which is 
devastating to the appellant, is to simply dismiss the appeal for not providing an 
accurate record.  As the court noted, when utilizing this “harsh” approach:  
[The appeallant] must meet its obligation as an appellant to provide us with a 
sufficient record that includes adequate findings of fact, or at least must take all 
procedural steps within its power to do so . . . . [B]ecause the [appellant] has failed 
to provide such record here, its appeal must fail.44   
The obvious effect of this approach is to punish the appellant for not requesting 
additional findings of fact, even though the trial judge also had an obligation to 
provide them.45   
The second approach that the Law Court has utilized more recently is the 
“inferential” standard—that is, the court is willing to infer that the trial judge found 
all facts in favor of the winning party.  The court has articulated this standard as 
follows:  
Absent a specific finding or request therefore, the trial court is presumed to have 
made all factual findings necessary to support its decision.  Since a finding that the 
stop was based upon “reasonable and articulable suspicion” was necessary to the 
court’s decision not to suppress the evidence, we must assume that it made such a 
finding.46 
Because the Law Court spent so much time addressing the findings of fact 
issue in Connor, even though it was irrelevant, one can make an educated guess as 
to how the court would handle the Hypo.  As he indicated in Connor, Justice 
Alexander would have used an “inferential” standard of review.  This standard 
allows the Law Court to respect the trial court’s judgment “if those inferred 
findings are supportable by evidence in the record.”47  In the Hypo, then, Justice 
Alexander would still find in favor of the State because there was some evidence in 
the record of the truck backing into the ditch (e.g., the officer’s testimony).  As part 
of this standard, the majority essentially would interpret an ambiguity in the record 
in favor of the winning party in the trial court. 
The dissenters seem to take a different approach.  Justice Clifford argued that 
the trial court had  “made no mention of Connor’s operation of the vehicle, and did 
not indicate that it was placing any reliance on the operation of the vehicle as 
contributing to the justification for the stop.  The court was not required to accept 
all of the evidence presented at the suppression hearing.”48  This would seem to 
indicate that if indeed the record were ambiguous as to a factual point, the 
                                                                                                     
 44. State v. Kneeland, 552 A.2d 4, 6 (Me. 1988). 
 45. Rule 41(A)(d) mandates that the judge provide findings of fact.  If either party is not satisfied 
with the judge’s findings, it is permitted to request further findings. ME. R. CRIM. P. 41(A)(d). 
 46. State v. D’Angelo, 605 A.2d 68, 70 (Me. 1992).  See also State v. Powell, 591 A.2d 1306 (Me. 
1991).  
 47. Connor, 2009 ME 91, ¶ 9, 977 A.2d at 1005. 
 48. Id., ¶ 17, 977 A.2d at 1007 (Clifford, J., dissenting). 
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dissenters would not infer anything.  Rather, they would solely rely on facts 
explicitly found by the court.  If this approach were applied to the Hypo, the end 
result would likely be much different.  More specifically, the ambiguity in the 
Hypo record—that is if the truck actually went into the ditch—would be resolved 
in favor of Connor simply because it was not addressed at all by the trial court.  
This approach seems fairly radical and a departure from the court’s jurisprudence. 
Lastly, if the Law Court had applied the “harsh” approach mentioned above—
that is, to simply dismiss appeals with ambiguous records—the result would be 
obvious.  Since Connor would be the appealing party, it would be his responsibility 
to request adequate findings of fact pursuant to Rule 41(A)(d) and provide them to 
the court for review.  Since the record would be inadequate, the court would uphold 
the trial judge’s determination without ever reaching the merits.  Again, this 
approach seems harsh as it places an extreme burden on the appealing party to 
make sure the record is free from factual ambiguities. 
IV.  THE “INFERENTIAL” STANDARD AND ITS EFFECT ON TRIAL JUDGES, THE LAW 
COURT, AND DEFENDANTS 
Applying these three approaches to the Hypo illustrates the radically different 
ways the Law Court could treat a case with an actual ambiguous factual record.  As 
noted, the court has used the “harsh” and “inferential” approaches before, but has 
never used the approach illustrated by the dissent.49  Surely, all of the justices 
would agree that they want to review motions to suppress with a deferential 
standard—that is, they only want to overturn a trial court’s factual determinations if 
they are clearly erroneous.50  This has sound policy implications.  Trial judges are 
best able to judge the weight and credibility of witness testimony, examine physical 
evidence, and review exhibits presented by attorneys.   However, as the Connor 
case shows, the two opinions take drastically different positions on how to review a 
motion to suppress when the factual record is less than perfect.  In the dissenting 
opinion, Justice Clifford believes that the “inferential” standard used by the 
majority will have negative effects on trial judges, attorneys, and defendants.51  
This part of the Note will examine if the “inferential” standard the majority opinion 
articulates actually does affect any constituents of the legal system as Justice 
Clifford feared.     
A.  Trial Judges 
It is debatable how an “inferential” standard of review affects trial judges.  At 
                                                                                                     
 49. After a diligent search, the Author could not find any examples where the court has used this 
approach in a suppression hearing context. 
 50. The majority maintained that the Law Court “will not substitute [its] judgment as to the weight 
or credibility of the evidence for that of the fact-finder if there is evidence in the record to rationally 
support the trial court’s result.  The trial court’s findings in this case must be judged by this deferential 
standard of review.” Connor, 2009 ME 91, ¶ 9, 977 A.2d at 1005.  On the other hand, the dissent argued 
that the Law Court’s “review of the [trial] court’s ultimate determination . . . should . . . be based solely 
on the facts found by the court, if supported by competent evidence in the record.” Id., ¶ 17, 977 A.2d at 
1007 (Clifford, J., dissenting). 
 51. Justice Clifford believes requests for further findings will increase the burden on attorneys and 
courts, and will result in higher attorneys fees. Id.,  n.5, 977 A.2d at 1007 (Clifford, J., dissenting). 
698 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:2 
first glance, this standard appears to lighten the workload for trial judges.  That is, 
if the Law Court is willing to infer all findings of fact in favor of the trial court’s 
opinion, the trial judge will not have to expound or go through pains to make the 
record clear.  However, the dissent seems to think the “inferential” standard will 
only make this duty more onerous.  As Justice Clifford noted:  
It is the nature of suppression motion practice that facts are often found . . . from 
the bench, and that requests for further findings . . . are also made orally and 
decided from the bench.  To require parties to always file a written motion for 
further findings following the hearing . . . will impose an unnecessary burden . . . 
on the courts.52   
Former Justice Hornby (now, ironically, a federal trial judge) also voiced this 
concern: “I believe it is unrealistic to expect . . . District Court judges, confronting 
the volume of cases they do without adequate secretarial assistance, to provide the 
detail we might prefer [in the findings of fact].”53  In essence, the only way an 
appellant could avoid the “inferential” standard would be to require trial judges to 
be painstakingly unambiguous in their findings.  This could result in longer 
hearings, more written motions, and essentially change the informal “nature of 
suppression motion practice.”54  On the other hand, if the appealing party does not 
request further findings of fact, a trial judge’s workload will be significantly 
reduced.  
B.  The Law Court 
To the Law Court, the inferential standard mentioned in this case is nothing 
new.  It typically uses this standard in reviewing trial court verdicts.  Because it is 
often impossible to determine what facts and witnesses juries credited during their 
deliberations, the court will generally infer that they found all facts necessary to 
convict if those inferred findings are supported by the evidence.  In essence, this 
makes the court’s job easier because the Law Court can defer to trial courts and 
does not have to make factual determinations.  However, the argument for using an 
inferential standard is seriously weakened in a suppression motion context, as trial 
judges are not only completely able but are also compelled to enter findings of fact 
adequate for review.55  Furthermore, even though motions to suppress are generally 
fact intensive, the applicable Fourth Amendment law still needs to be applied 
correctly to those facts.56  Hence, a clear record would actually make the 
application of the law easier for the court. 
C.  Defendants 
Lastly, the defendants themselves are affected by this “inferential” standard.  
More motions for further findings will mean more time for scheduling, deciding, 
                                                                                                     
 52. Id. 
 53. Kneeland, 552 A.2d at 8 (Hornby, J., dissenting). 
 54. Connor, 2009 ME 91, n. 5, 977 A.2d at 1007 (Clifford, J., dissenting). 
 55. ME. R. CRIM. P.  41(A)(d). 
 56. This is illustrated by the Hypo.  If it were unclear whether Connor backed into the ditch, the 
court would have had a difficult time applying the Fourth Amendment to the case. 
2010] STATE V. CONNOR 699 
and writing opinions—all of which will result in longer delays for the defendant 
and higher attorney’s fees. Most importantly, if a suppression motion is wrongly 
decided by the trial court, and the Law Court does not insist on a clear record, then 
there exists a real possibility that the error in the trial court will not be corrected on 
appeal.  Without the ability to correct trial court mistakes, the Law Court 
essentially loses all value to defendants. 
V.  HOW THE COURT SHOULD ADDRESS A REAL  
AMBIGUITY IN THE FINDINGS OF FACT 
With these competing considerations, it is hard to imagine a way to review an 
ambiguous record that would not have negative consequences for some and 
positive outcomes for others.  Also, any change in criminal practice—where liberty 
is at stake—should carefully balance the due process rights of the accused with the 
need for an effective and expeditious judicial system.  While keeping these 
important values in the background, this part of the Note will propose a change in 
how the Law Court should review ambiguous factual records from suppression 
hearings and articulate the reasons for that change.  More specifically, the Law 
Court should abandon the “inferential” guessing game57 it currently plays and 
replace it with a structure under which appeals with inadequate records are simply 
not entertained, except in cases where the appealing party made a good-faith effort 
to provide adequate findings of fact.  In the case where the appealing party makes 
the effort to clarify and expand an ambiguous record, yet the trial judge’s findings 
of fact are still incomplete or ambiguous, the Law Court should remand the case for 
further findings of fact.   
A.  Step One: Turn Away Appeals with Inadequate Records 
In almost all contexts of appellate review, the appealing party bears the burden 
of providing a clear record for the appellate court to review.  The Law Court has 
made it clear that this general rule applies to criminal and civil cases alike:  
An appellant has the burden of supplying this Court with a record adequate to 
permit a fair consideration of the issues presented for review.  When the record 
made available to the Law Court to support an appeal is inadequate, such appeal 
must fail, and this applies in criminal appeals as it does on the civil side.58   
For reasons that are not entirely clear, the court has relaxed this rule over the years 
and has  “inferred” findings of fact when the record has been unclear, as discussed 
above.59  However, re-establishing this bright line (albeit harsh) rule will ultimately 
benefit the Law Court in conducting its review of suppression motions.   
                                                                                                     
 57. This is referred to as a “game” because the Law Court does not know how the trial court 
decided the issue.  Instead, it just assumes or guesses that it found in favor of the winning party. 
 58. State v. Thwing, 487 A.2d 260, 262 (Me. 1985).  See also State v. Kerr, 455 A.2d 425, 425 (Me. 
1982); State v. MacArthur, 417 A.2d 976, 979 (Me. 1980); State v. Howard, 405 A.2d 206, 208 (Me. 
1979). 
 59. In Kneeland, the Law Court rejected an appeal from a suppression motion because the findings 
of fact presented to it were insufficient.  It did not “infer” anything from the trial judge’s ruling.  
Kneeland, 552 A.2d at 6. 
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At first glance, this strict structure appears to impose additional burdens on 
attorneys, and consequently, on trial judges.  An attorney who is faced with the 
threat of having an appeal denied for an inadequate record will be sure to clarify 
the record to the best of her ability.  This may result in additional questions and the 
occasional written motion, which in turn, produces work for the trial judge.  
However, as Justice Clifford pointed out in his dissent, these are generally informal 
hearings where most of the questions and answers are oral.  It is hard to imagine 
how a few clarifying questions could impose a truly arduous burden on either the 
attorney or the trial judge.  Furthermore, as zealous advocates for a defendant with 
his or her liberty on the line, an attorney should be encouraged to ask questions and 
clarify the record—after all, part of what the attorney’s job.  Lastly, because 
attorneys practice in a field where a definitive answer is rarely certain, it seems that 
an attorney would appreciate a bright-line standard over an unclear one.   
Of course, the Law Court is the real beneficiary of this change.  The court is 
able to keep its deferential standard of review (clear error), can easily dispose of 
appeals without adequate records (instead of trying to “infer” what the trial judge 
found), and will ultimately receive more thorough findings of fact from the trial 
courts to review.  This will also result in a more accurate application of the law to 
the specific facts of each case, which is one of the primary functions of an appellate 
court.   
B.  Provide a “Good-Faith” Exception and Allow for  
Remand if the Record Is Inadequate or Ambiguous 
This hard-line approach would seem to leave some appellants out in the cold.  
For example, if this approach had been used in the Hypo, then Connor’s appeal 
would not have been heard at all.  However, the Law Court should allow for a 
“good-faith” exception—that is, when the appealing attorney made an honest and 
good-faith attempt to clarify an ambiguity in the record or expound the trial court’s 
recited findings, the Law Court should remand the case to the trial court for clearer 
and fuller findings of fact.  Once the clarified findings are completed, the Law 
Court could hear the case with a clear record—eliminating the need for the 
“inferential” guessing game that is currently utilized. 
This approach is hardly radical—it has been utilized by the Law Court in other 
contexts60 and by courts in other states in the suppression context.61  The use of 
                                                                                                     
 60. See, e.g., Chapel Rd. Assocs. v. Town of Wells, 2001 ME 178, ¶ 1, 787 A.2d 137, 138 
(concluding “that the Board’s findings of fact are insufficient to permit appellate review, we vacate the 
Superior Court’s judgment with instructions to remand the matter to the Board for findings of fact.”). 
 61. See, e.g., Arizona v. Zamora, 202 P.3d 528 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009) (remanding because the record 
was insufficient for the appellate court to determine whether defendant’s statement should be 
suppressed); Johnson v. Wyoming, 214 P.3d 983 (Wyo. 2009) (holding that the record on appeal was 
insufficient to allow for appellate review, and thus remand was required for factual findings and 
conclusions of law in a suppression hearing); Oregon v. Lantzsch, 214 P.3d 22, (Or. Ct. App. 2009) 
(holding trial court’s failure to make finding of fact regarding whether defendant subjectively believed 
that he had been seized required remand); Skjervem v. Alaska, 215 P.3d 1101 (Alaska 2009) (remanding 
a case to the trial court for further findings of fact on a suppression hearing); Tennessee v. Gentry, No. 
02C01-9708-CC-00335, 1998 Tenn. Crim. App. 1998 WL 351228, at *2 (July 2, 1998) (holding that the 
trial court “failed to perform its affirmative duty and state the essential findings on the record,” and as a 
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remand for further findings of fact by an appellate court serves an important 
function: by remanding cases with incomplete factual records, the Law Court will 
ensure that it has an adequate record to review if the case subsequently returns for 
review and can apply the appropriate law to an accurate reading of the facts.  
However, by limiting the remand option to the rare cases where the appealing party 
made a good-faith effort to provide an accurate and unambiguous record, the Law 
Court will ensure that the amount of extra work for trial judges and attorneys is 
limited.  Thus, it seems that remanding only in these limited circumstances would 
not have much strain on any of the competing constituencies mentioned above.   
Had this method been used in the Hypo, it is likely that the case would have 
been remanded for further (and clearer) findings of fact.62  Since the findings would 
be viewed as ambiguous, the case should have been turned down unless Connor 
could show he made a good-faith effort at clarifying the record.  As the dissent 
points out, Connor’s attorney did make such an effort, so under this proposed 
change, the Hypo would have been remanded to the trial court to answer a single 
question—if Connor actually backed into the ditch or not.  This would result in a 
better application of the law by the Law Court, and the extra work required of the 
trial court and attorneys would have been minimal.  Meanwhile, the defendant 
would have had his case more accurately reviewed for legal error.  This ultimately 
benefits the Law Court and the defendants, while not drastically harming the trial 
court. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
This proposed change is not the only way the Law Court could deal with this 
issue.  The court could choose to amend Rule 41(A)(d) to further mandate 
unambiguous findings of fact.63  However, given that the rule already makes 
findings of fact mandatory64 for the trial judge, it is unlikely that such a change 
would have any real effect.  The court could also consider remanding any case in 
which the findings of fact are ambiguous—however, this would likely result in the 
remanding of many cases, and consequently, an increased workload for busy trial 
judges.  On the other hand, the court could use the “inferential” standard mentioned 
by the majority in Connor.  However, as the Hypo illustrates, this could cause the 
court to infer something that was never actually found by the trial judge.  
Eventually, if this standard is used, the court will get it wrong and infer something 
incorrectly, resulting in the punishment of an innocent person.   Thus, it seems the 
change that this Note proposes is an effective way to better serve the Law Court, 
criminal defendants, and trial judges.  The bright-line nature of the rule will make it 
easy for attorneys and trial judges to follow, and make sure that they live up to their 
Rule 41(A)(d) obligations to request further findings of fact.  More accurate 
findings of fact will result in more meaningful appellate review, which benefits 
                                                                                                     
result, on remand, the trial judge would be required to “state on the record the factual findings that 
support his legal conclusions.”). 
 62. This assumes that Connor’s attorney in the Hypo had requested a clarification on the ditch issue, 
yet the trial judge still did not provide a clear answer. 
 63. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 9 (2003). 
 64. ME. R. CRIM. P. 41(A)(d) advisory committee note to 1986 Amendment.  
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both the Law Court and the accused.  Although in Connor the court only needed to 
review an ambiguous legal conclusion, this suggestion may improve their review 
should the court ever actually review a motion to suppress with ambiguous findings 
of fact. 
 
